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ABSTRACT 
Ever increasing scope and complexity of regulations and other rules that govern human society 
emphasise importance of the inspection of compliance to those rules. Often-used approaches to the 
inspection of compliance suffer from drawbacks such as overly idealistic assumptions and narrowness 
of application. Specifically, inspection models are frequently limited to situations where inspected 
entity has to comply with only one rule. Furthermore, inspection strategies regularly overlook some 
useful and available information such as varying costs of compliance to different rules. 
This article presents an agent-based model for inspection of compliance to many rules, which 
addresses abovementioned drawbacks. In the article, crime economic, game-theoretic and agent-based 
modelling approaches to inspection are briefly described, as well as their impact on the model. The 
model is described and simulation of a simplified version of the model is presented. The obtained 
results demonstrate that inspection strategies which take into account rules’ compliance costs perform 
significantly better than random strategies and better than cycle-based strategies. Additionally, the 
results encourage further, wider testing and validation of the model. 
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In 1788 in The Federalist James Madison2 famously stated: If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary. However, men, as we know, are not angels. 
Human society of today is reliant on an ever-increasing mass of regulations, rules and other 
social norms. Changes in regulations reflect changes in society and in our understanding of 
the processes inside society as well as between society and the environment. Increase in 
society’s interconnectedness and complexity is reflected by the rise in scope and complexity 
of regulations, particularly in areas such as financial regulation [1] and environmental 
regulation [2], and in particular in the US and the EU. 
In democratic societies, regulations typically introduce limitations and rules of conduct that 
should, in the end, be beneficial to the society as a whole. However, to individuals and 
organizations that have to obey those regulations, they might seem overly cumbersome, 
useless or even counterproductive. If opportunity arises, individuals as well as companies 
might try to violate the rules or shirk from their responsibilities since, as Madison pointed out, 
men are not angels. Therefore, there usually has to be a detriment or penalty for noncompliant 
entities, for regulations to be effective. Since regulations are typically not self-enforcing, they 
require some sort of external coercion mechanism such as law enforcement agencies, 
inspection agencies, etc. Inspection agencies and similar organizations usually want to 
achieve maximum compliance with rules and regulations under their authority. However, 
those agencies are not omniscient and usually cannot know whether an entity is compliant or 
not, without performing some sort of inspection procedure. On the other hand, inspection 
procedures and available resources are rarely such to allow total coverage of all constituents. 
Therefore, one of the key challenges for any inspection organization is optimal selection of 
entities for inspection. This selection process should identify – as correctly as possible – violators, 
and punish them. Additionally, the inspection procedure should serve as a deterrent to unwanted 
behaviour. To complicate matters further, the expanding regulatory landscape and rise in 
complexity and numerousness of constituents is often not met with correspondingly 
expanding inspection resources. Therefore, rise in efficiency of the inspection selection 
process becomes paramount. 
Inspection selection and inspection itself have been objects of extensive scientific inquiry. 
There are several approaches to the matter, and each has noteworthy weaknesses. Firstly, 
analysis of historical data delivers valuable insights, but it cannot establish causation and isolate 
variables. Real-world experimentation is often legally impossible or ethically unacceptable. 
Laboratory setups and surveys can be performed, but often encounter difficulties when trying to 
recreate real-world setups and incentives. Finally, various modelling approaches are often 
utilised, but they are also plagued with shortcomings such as overly simplistic assumptions, 
narrow outlook, limited application, analytical insolvability, lack of empirical validation, etc. 
This article outlines several modelling approaches to analysis of the inspection problem and 
underlines their advantages and limitations. Moreover, the article presents ICARUS 
(acronym: Inspecting Compliance to mAny RUleS), an agent-based model for inspection of 
compliance to many rules. The model describes a generic environment in which one 
inspection agency inspects compliance of a set of entities to a group of rules. Finally, the 
article demonstrates a simplified simulation environment of the model and tests the working 
hypothesis that conduct of inspections based on knowledge of resource needs for compliance 
reduces total non-compliance in the system. 
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INSPECTION MODELS: ASSUMPTIONS AND APPROACHES 
Inspection models are based on numerous assumptions about human behaviour and motives. 
Some assumptions are intuitively understandable, while others less so. Moreover, inspection 
models’ outcomes can be vastly different and even contradictory, depending on the 
underlying assumptions. 
In this section, the basic assumptions arising from the human rationality and its boundedness 
are briefly explained and two main modelling approaches – inspection games and agent based 
modelling – are outlined. 
CRIME ECONOMICS AND HUMAN RATIONALITY 
Traditionally, non-compliance with the established sets of social norms, including laws, was 
considered a sign of lack of character, mental illness or social inadaptability. 18
th
 century 
economists and criminologists started to change that outlook by describing humans as rational 
beings who make decisions based on scrupulous analysis of potential benefits and costs of 
their actions. Cesare Beccaria in his seminal work On Crimes and Punishments in 1765 extended 
the utility theory to crime and argued that, in regards to criminal justice, people act with free 
will, in rational manner and try to achieve their own personal gratification. Accordingly, people 
will be deterred from crime when the punishment outweighs benefits of the crime. 
The notion that human rationality is the foundation of decision-making dominates classical 
economics. In the context of economics of crime, Becker formalized that idea through his 
economic model of crime [3]. According to the model, potential criminals make their 
decisions based on comparison of benefits of crime and expected costs, which reflect 
sanction cost and probability of sanction’s occurrence. This model does not apply only to 
individuals, but to companies and other organizations as well. It could be argued that 
companies, and especially publically traded companies, present an even more “natural” 
background for the economic model of crime since their utility function is unambiguous – 
maximization of shareholder profit. Hence, companies (or their management) are even 
more likely to try to objectively assess benefits and expected costs of crime (or non-
compliance) and act accordingly. 
The economic model of crime allows deduction of further conclusions. In complex environments 
such as banking, companies have to obey a myriad of rules. Violation of rules will, if detected, 
result in sanctions, and costs of those sanctions might vary in respect to the rule that was 
violated. However, in many regulated environments fines (sanctions) are pre-determined and 
are often the same for groups of rules or even for all the rules contained in a legal act. 
Although compliance with the rules might not have any direct benefits for the regulated entity, 
it will – almost certainly – incur certain costs. Those costs will vary, depending on the 
requirements of specific rules. Some rules might be inexpensive to comply with (e.g. rules with 
details on how to perform various administrative procedures), some could require 
considerable resources (e.g. establishment of certain processes or organizational units) and 
some could incur massive costs (e.g. additional capital requirements). In such setup, 
companies might objectively assess compliance cost, sanction cost and probability of its 
incurrence and decide to comply with some rules while violating others. 
However, although the rationality hypothesis is very useful in analysis of human behaviour, 
it is also highly demanding. Perfect rationality requires complete knowledge of the 
environment – in our simplified case; it would imply perfect knowledge of potential 
benefits and sanctions of non-compliance, as well as perfect knowledge of probability of 
sanction’s occurrence. Furthermore, it requires clear preferences, unbiasedness and ability 
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to calculate perfectly, in real time [4]. These strong requirements are often unattainable in 
real life, and the human rationality requirement is often softened via the concept of 
bounded rationality. Bounded rationality, which was first presented by Simon [5], relaxes 
rationality requirements by acknowledging that although humans try to make fully rational 
decisions, they are fallible in their decision-making – they have biases, they are unable to 
calculate probabilities perfectly, they make mistakes in logic and act in situations with 
incomplete information. Experimental evidence supports the idea that human rationality is 
bounded in the area of crime economics [6]. 
Inspection models mostly heavily rely on ideas of rationality and/or bounded rationality. 
GAME THEORY AND INSPECTION GAMES 
Game theory can concisely be described as a formal study of conflict and cooperation [7] and 
was first applied to inspection problems by Dresher in 1962 [8]. Although it was initially 
applied to inspection of compliance to nuclear disarmament treaties, in subsequent years it 
was applied to a plethora of inspection problems. The applications include accountancy and 
auditing, tax inspection, enforcement of environmental regulations, crime control, smuggling 
(so-called smuggling game), relationship between politicians and bureaucrats (so-called 
oversight game), etc. Overview of literature on inspection game can be found in [9-11]. 
Inspection game, in game theoretic setting, presents a special class of non-cooperative 
games
3
. The basic interactions in the inspection game are shown in Figure 1. An entity that is 
obliged to comply with a certain rule decides (step I) to comply or violate that rule. In step II 
inspector decides whether to inspect the given entity or not. When deciding whether to 
violate or comply, the entity does not know with certainty whether the inspector will inspect. 
Correspondingly, inspector – when deciding whether to inspect or not – does not know 
whether the entity violates the rule or complies with it. Payoff matrix is shown in table in the 
Figure 1. The game has no stationary equilibrium since relationships between payoffs imply 
that players always have reasons to change their strategies. I.e. if the entity knew that 
inspector will inspect, it would comply with the rules. However, if inspector knew that the 
entity will comply, it would prefer not to inspect. And if the entity knew that inspector will 
not inspect, it would violate, which would then entice inspector to inspect, and so on. Arrows 
in the payoff matrix indicate the order of players’ preferences. 
 


































































Entity   
Comply 
(1-p) 
  iCI   iCN 
eCI   eCN   
Violate 
(p) 
  iVI   iVN 
eVI   eVN   
 
 
eCI > eVI 
 
 
iCN > iCI 
eVN > eCN iVI > iVN 
 
Figure 1. Inspection game in extended and in normal form. 
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In line with that, the only equilibrium strategies are mixed strategies. That is, if p is 
probability of violation and q is probability of inspection, the optimal mix of pure strategies 
was calculated by Tsebelis [12] and is given by (1)3: 
 𝑝∗  =  
𝑖VN− 𝑖VI
𝑖CI− 𝑖CN+ 𝑖VN− 𝑖VI
                        𝑞∗  =  
𝑒CN− 𝑒VN
𝑒CN− 𝑒VN+ 𝑒VI− 𝑒CI
, (1) 
The values of p* and q* reflect the essence of the game-theoretic approach to inspection. 
Game theory is analysis of strategic interaction between players and, in line with that, 
decisions of each player are primarily influenced by what that player believes will be the 
actions of the other player. Accordingly, entity’s probability of violation (p*) is influenced 
exclusively by inspector’s payoffs, and inspector’s probability of inspection (q*) is influenced 
exclusively by entity’s payoffs. Significant complications arise with such result, namely, it is a 
very bold assumption that entity will know all inspector’s payoffs and vice-versa. Because of 
described relationship between payoffs, both players in an inspection game have incentives to 
hide their motivations and, hence, payoffs from the other player. Furthermore, stated solution 
implies that entity’s decision whether to violate (p*) is completely independent of the size of 
penalty (eVI) which is in contradiction with the economic model of crime and some 
experimental results [6]. Tsebelis’ conclusions have been studied and analysed (interestingly, 
Tsebelis’ model was rarely tested experimentally [13; p.156]) and it has been concluded that 
the analytical results are valid, but that they reflect a very simplified setup (one-off game with 
only 2 players and with complete information) [14]. Furthermore, divergences between 
results of the simplified model and reality can be explained by players’ bounded rationality 
[6]. It is interesting to note that the situation where one centralised inspection agency inspects 
compliance of numerous agents fits Becker’s model much better than Tsebelis’ [15]. 
Many classic inspection games consider similarly simple setup. However, most real-life 
scenarios (e.g. financial inspection, inspection of environmental protection, compliance 
audits, etc.) require introduction of more complex parameters such as: 
1) the game is played repeatedly, 
2) there is more than one entity that can be inspected (one-inspector-n-inspectees or m-
inspectors-n-inspectees scenarios), 
3) players' rationality is not perfect but bounded, 
4) players possess imperfect and incomplete information,  
5) players are heterogeneous (e.g. entities are characterized by different payoffs, possess 
different information and their rationality is bounded in different ways), and 
6) players learn and adapt. 
Introduction of more complex parameters to the inspection game makes the model more 
realistic, but also significantly complicates or even thwarts its analytical solvability. Authors 
who study inspection games continually add complexity to their models, however, even 
recently developed inspection game models that introduce complications and better 
correspond to the situation that is analysed in this article still include very limiting assumptions. 
E.g. in a setup that is somewhat similar to the one analysed in this article, Deutsch and Golany 
describe a finitely repeated inspection game with single inspector and several agents, where 
inspector tries to optimally allocate limited inspection resources [16], but the game still has 
very limiting assumptions such as complete information. 
Although inspection games might be limited in their ability to introduce complexity and 
remain solvable, elements of inspection game and general circumstances described in the 
inspection game can be successfully used in other modelling approaches such as agent-based 
modelling. Furthermore, game-theoretic setting has a great value in highlighting strategic 
relationship between actors. 
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AGENT-BASED MODELLING (ABM) 
Agent-based modelling (ABM)5 arose from research on complex adaptive systems. Agents are 
independent, commonly software-implemented entities, which have a set of characteristics, 
take actions depending upon certain conditions and interact with each other [17]. There are 
numerous sources that describe when [17], how [18-20] and why [17] to use ABM. 
ABM is being used in the field of social sciences, because of its unique capabilities for describing 
complex systems, knowledge discovery and hypothesis testing [21]. The ABM approach is 
particularly relevant in cases where it is not possible to conduct experiments to test certain 
social phenomena because of ethical or legal considerations. In addition, the cost of model 
development and running of simulations is typically significantly lower than the cost of 
conducting experiments that test certain social phenomena. 
ABM and game theory are, in many ways, considerably different approaches to modelling. While 
the game theory is structured, analytical and demanding in constructing and solving of the 
models, the ABM allows great flexibility in devising models and setting their parameters. ABM 
can also easily incorporate ideas and concepts from game theory, crime economics, etc. Parameters 
such as those mentioned in the ordered list in the previous chapter are easy or even trivial to apply 
and implement. ABMs that model inspections often use assumptions from the inspection game 
and particularly the assumption about bounded rationality of agents. Interestingly and more 
generally, vast majority of agent-based models implement bounded rational agents [17]. It is no 
wonder then that ABM has been extensively used for analysis of inspection problems. 
The area where ABM is particularly extensively used is analysis of tax compliance and tax 
inspection. Tax inspection models are often very different, particularly in relation to their 
complexity. For example, in [22-27] a number of models have been described and analysed, 
each with different assumptions, different levels of complexity (models that were developed 
earlier are simpler, and later models are more complex), different validation methods and are 
developed in different simulation environments. ABM has also been used in analysis of 
(inspection of) crime [6, 28] and banking supervision [29]. All cited ABM inspection game 
models (with exception of [29]) model situations in which compliance to only one rule is 
analysed (one-entity-one-rule). 
The most significant downside in use of the ABM is difficult rigorous validation of the 
model. Most ABM models are very specific and are validated (if at all) against a limited set 
of narrow, field-specific data. 
THE ICARUS MODEL 
The main motivation for development of the ICARUS model is the fact that inspection 
models almost exclusively consider one-entity-one-rule environments, which is a very bold 
assumption, especially when considering inspection of regulatory compliance in highly 
regulated areas (financial services, environmental protection, etc.). Further motivation is to 
have a polygon for testing the hypothesis that use of knowledge about resource needs in 
conduct of inspections can reduce the total number of violations in the system, which might 
be particularly relevant for regulatory compliance in highly regulated areas. 
The proposed ICARUS model is an agent-based model of compliance inspection in which 
one inspection agency (inspector) inspects whether a set of entities (agents) are compliant 
with a set of rules. The main motivations for use of the ABM approach are flexibility of such 
approach, legal restrictions concerning experimental approach to regulatory compliance and 
limitations of purely game-theoretic approach. 
In the following sub-chapters, modelling environment, assumptions and formal representation 
of the ICARUS model are presented. 
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MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND THE GENERAL OUTSET 
The basic idea and driver for development of the resource requirements focused model is the 
assumption that costs of compliance can be used as signals that are available to inspector 
(with some degree of accuracy). Based on those signals, inspections could be directed in a 
way that would detect non-compliance with higher precision and, in turn, reduce total non-
compliance in the system. 
There are 2 types of actors in the model (inspector and entities) with conflicting interests. 
Relationship between the inspector and entities can be described, in game-theoretic terms, as 
a non-cooperative, non-zero sum, finitely repeated inspection game between one inspector 
and several inspectees (entities), with incomplete information. The model operates in discrete 
time intervals. In each interval entities make violate/comply decisions for each rule, and 
inspectors make inspect/not inspect decisions for each entity-rule pair. 
Entities and inspector behave as follows: 
1) each entity is characterized by a decision-making process that includes an internal 
component, which reflects entity’s compliance resource requirements, and an external 
component by which entity assesses probability of inspection, based on some known 
inspector-related parameters, and 
2) inspector’s decision-making process is determined by the selected inspection strategy. In 
essence, it is an optimal assignment problem since the inspector is trying to optimally 
allocate his limited inspection resources to achieve the lowest total number of violations in 
the system. However, an important drawback for inspector is that he does not know the 
total number of violations in the system at any time (unless he can inspect all entity-rule 
pairs simultaneously, which is not a realistic prospect and trivializes the inspection problem). 
The model fully utilizes advantages the ABM approach. First and foremost, agents (entities) 
are heterogeneous: 
1) entities are characterized by different resource requirements needed for compliance (costs 
of compliance) with each of the rules. These differences in costs of compliance reflect 
differences in entities' internal organization, complexity, size, business model, etc. 
However, although there are some differences in resource requirements between entities, 
resource requirements also have and underlying orderedness across entities, which is also 
known to inspector (e.g. in any bank, costs of capital requirements are higher than costs 
associated with some administrative procedure), and 
2) entities differ in their risk appetite (or risk preference), which influences their assessment 
of the inspection probability. Risk appetite variable reflects two findings: Firstly, risk 
preferences differ among people and might present a stable personality trait [30]; secondly, 
decision-makers are not perfectly rational when assessing risk [31]. This bias also models 
agents' bounded rationality in decision-making. 
Furthermore, the model assumes imperfect and incomplete information. A limited set of 
variables are known to all players (inspector and all entities), while the majority of variables 
are known only locally. Every entity knows only its own payoffs. Entity’s utility function is 
based on the economic model of crime and is influenced by costs of compliance, costs of 
mandatory punishments and entity’s own assessment of probability of inspection of each rule. 
When assessing the probability of inspection, entities consider their own inspection history 
record and based on that and some general information about the system, try to estimate 
probability of inspection in that time interval. Furthermore, each entity is locally connected to 
several other entities and shares information with them. Of particular interest is information 
whether violations were punished or not, which either reinforces compliance (if violations are 
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punished) or noncompliance (if violations are unpunished). This mechanism mimics 
experimentally observed “broken windows” dynamics [13]. 
The model presumes that entities and inspector use their historical data (memories) about 
inspections to make assumptions about the future. Such approach is in contrast with the idea 
of forward-looking decision-making by a rational individual, but fits well with the idea of 
boundedly rational behaviour and empirical findings related to learning from experience [32].  
FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
Let ℰ ≡ {1, … , 𝑛} be a set of n entities (agents, organizations), 𝑛 ∈ ℕ, where each entity in ℰ 
is obliged to comply with all the social norms (rules) contained in 𝒪 ≡ {1, … , 𝑚}, 𝑚 ∈ ℕ. 
Each entity in ℰ  at every discrete time interval t  in set 𝒯 ≡ {1, … , 𝜏}  decides whether to 
comply or violate each of the rules contained in 𝒪. Compliance with the rules is monitored by 
the inspection agency (inspector) ℐ. In every 𝑡 ∈  𝒯, ℐ decides whether it will inspect each of 
possible combinations (pairs) of entities and rules. When entity 𝑖 decides whether it will 
comply or violate rule 𝑗 in 𝑡, it does not know whether ℐ will inspect {𝑖, 𝑗} at 𝑡. Analogously, 
when ℐ decides which pairs of entities and rules it will inspect at 𝑡, it does not know the state 
of compliance. However, after inspecting {𝑖, 𝑗}  at 𝑡 , ℐ  knows, with certainty, whether 𝑖 
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Figure 2. Inspector-entity interaction displayed in the extended-form. 
If the inspector detects violation of a rule, it will punish respective entity with a fine. Fines 
can be rule-specific and are contained in the vector: 
 𝒌 ≡ (𝑘1, … , 𝑘m), {𝑘j | 𝑘j ∈ ℤ ⋀ 𝑘j < 0},  ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝒪. (2) 
Features and behaviour of entities (agents) 
Entity 𝑖 is characterized by a vector of resource needs for fulfilling each rule in 𝒪: 
 𝒄𝐢 ≡ (𝑐i1, … , 𝑐im), {𝑐ij | 𝑐ij ∈ ℝ ⋀ 𝑐ij < 0}, ∀𝑖 ∈ ℰ, ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝒪. (3) 
Furthermore, entities differ in their risk appetite, which influences their assessment of 
inspection probability. Risk appetite of the entity 𝑖 is given with (4): 
 𝑟i ∈ ℝ, ∀𝑖 ∈ ℰ. (4) 
Decision whether to comply or violate the rules is further influenced by the information 
acquired from other connected entities. Association of entity 𝑖 with other entities is defined 
by the vector: 
 𝒈𝐢 ≡ (𝑔i1, … , 𝑔in), 𝑔ip ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖, 𝑝 ∈ ℰ. (5) 
Associations between entities are symmetric (if entity 𝑖 is connected to entity 𝑝, then 𝑝 is also 
connected to 𝑖): 
 {𝑔ip | 𝑔ip ∈ {0,1} ⋀ 𝑔ii = 1 ⋀ 𝑔ip = 𝑔pi}, ∀𝑖, 𝑝 ∈ ℰ. (6) 
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Possible values of the association vector are: 
 𝑔ip = {
  0,      if 𝑖 and 𝑝 are not conncected,
1,      if 𝑖 and 𝑝 are conncected,      
       ∀ 𝑖, 𝑝 ∈ ℰ. (7) 
Entities also keep track of inspections’ history. At 𝑡, entity 𝑖 knows the results of inspections 
to which it was subjected in the last 𝑙 time intervals. The results of inspections known to i at 𝑡 
are given with (8). 
 𝝌𝒊(𝑡) ≡ (ℎ𝑖(𝑡 − 1), … , ℎ𝑖(𝑡 − 𝑙)), 
 ℎ𝑖 ∈ {0, 𝑎, 𝑏}, {𝑡, 𝑙 | 𝑡 ∈  𝒯 ⋀ 𝑙 ∈  𝒯 ⋀ 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑡}, 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℕ, ∀𝑖 ∈ ℰ. (8) 
Possible values of the inspection history vector of entity 𝑖 are: 
 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡 − 𝑢) = {
𝑎,    if inspector detected violation at  𝑡 − 𝑢,
0,    if i was not inspected at 𝑡 − 𝑢,
     𝑏,    if inspector detected compliance at  𝑡 − 𝑢,
, 
 {𝑢 | 𝑢 ∈  𝒯 ⋀ 1 ≤ 𝑢 ≤ 𝑙}  . (9) 
Entities make rational decisions whether to comply with or violate each rule in 𝒪, by comparing 
cost of compliance and expected punishment disutility. The expected punishment disutility of 
entity 𝑖 for violating rule 𝑗 at 𝑡 is given with the product of proscribed penalty 𝑘j and entity’s 
subjective assessment of the inspection probability at 𝑡: 𝑝ij(𝑡). 𝑝ij(𝑡) is a valuation function:  
 𝑝ij(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑐ij, 𝑟i, 𝑔i, 𝜒i(𝑡), 𝐼C),  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ ℰ, ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝒪, ∀ 𝑡 ∈  𝒯. (10) 
The subjective assessments of inspection probability at 𝑡 of all the rules in 𝒪 for the entity 𝑖 
are contained in the vector: 
 𝒑𝐢(𝑡) ≡ (𝑝i1(𝑡), … , 𝑝im(𝑡)), {𝑝ij | 𝑝ij ∈  ℝ ∧  0 ≤ 𝑝ij ≤ 1}, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ ℰ, ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝒪, ∀ 𝑡 ∈  𝒯.(11) 
In line with that, the subjective expected utility (SEU) function for the entity 𝑖 at 𝑡 is: 
𝜋i(𝑡) ≡ ∑ max [𝑐ij, 𝑝ij(𝑡) ∙ 𝑘j]
𝑚
𝑗=1
, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ ℰ, ∀ 𝑡 ∈  𝒯. (12) 
In line with the subjective assessments of the inspection probability and the resulting 
decisions, the state of compliance of entity 𝑖 with all the rules in 𝒪 at 𝑡 is given with the 
vector: 
 𝒐𝐢(𝑡) ≡ (𝑜i1(𝑡), … , 𝑜im(𝑡)), 𝑜ij ∈ {−1,1}, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ ℰ, ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝒪, ∀ 𝑡 ∈  𝒯. (13) 
Possible values of the compliance vector are: 
 𝑜ij(𝑡) = {
−1,     𝑖𝑓    𝑐ij < 𝑝ij(𝑡)  ∙ 𝑘j  (violation),
1,     𝑖𝑓    𝑐ij > 𝑝ij(𝑡)  ∙ 𝑘j  (compliance),
~𝑈{−1,1},     𝑖𝑓    𝑐ij = 𝑝ij(𝑡)  ∙ 𝑘j  (random selection),
 
  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ ℰ, ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝒪, ∀ 𝑡 ∈  𝒯 . (14) 
 
Features and behaviour of the inspector 
Inspector’s main objective is to reduce the total number of violations in 𝒯. The total number 
of violations is given with (15): 






𝑡=1 . (15) 
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It is important to note that the inspector does not know the total number of violations in 𝒯 
and that he can, in general, observe only a very limited set of data. Namely, ℐ is not aware of 
entities’ true preferences and compliance resource needs; it can only make estimates based on 
the known inspection history and his own knowledge about compliance resource needs. On 
the other hand, inspector is aware that entities are rational in their decision-making. 
Inspector’s knowledge of the compliance resource needs is contained in the vector: 
 𝒅 ≡ (𝑑1, … , 𝑑m), {𝑑j | 𝑑j ∈ ℝ ∧ 𝑑j < 0}, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝒪. (16) 
ℐ keeps track of inspections’ history for the last 𝑙  intervals,  𝑙 ∈  𝒯 . The entire history of 
inspections that is known to ℐ at 𝑡  is contained in the three-dimensional matrix 𝑆(𝑡) . 
Correspondingly, the history of inspections of the entity 𝑖 at 𝑡 is: 
 𝑆i(𝑡) ≡  [
𝑠i1(𝑡 − 1) ⋯ 𝑠i1(𝑡 − 𝑙)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑠im(𝑡 − 1) ⋯ 𝑠im(𝑡 − 𝑙)
], 
  𝑠ij ∈ {−1,0,1}, {𝑡, 𝑙 | 𝑡 ∈  𝒯 ⋀ 𝑙 ∈  𝒯 ⋀ 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑡}, ∀𝑖 ∈ ℰ, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝒪. (17) 
In other words, at 𝑡, inspector is aware of the result of inspection of the rule 𝑗 in entity 𝑖 that 
was performed before 𝑢 intervals and is given with (18): 
 𝑠ij(𝑡 − 𝑢) = {
−1,       𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑡 𝑡 − 𝑢 𝑖 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑜ij(𝑡 − 𝑢) = −1
0,       𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑡 𝑡 − 𝑢 𝑖 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑                                  
1,       𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑡 𝑡 − 𝑢 𝑖 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑜ij(𝑡 − 𝑢) = 1
   , 
 {𝑢 | 𝑢 ∈  𝒯 ⋀ 1 ≤ 𝑢 ≤ 𝑙}. (18) 
Furthermore, inspector’s inspection capacity is limited and at 𝑡  it can perform only 𝐼C 
inspections of entity-rule pairs {𝑖, 𝑗}, i ∈ ℰ, 𝑗 ∈ 𝒪 , {𝐼C | 𝐼C ∈ ℕ ∧ 0 ≤ 𝐼C ≤ mn}. Therefore, at 
𝑡 , ℐ  selects 𝐼(𝑡)  for inspection where 𝐼(𝑡) ⊆  ℰ × 𝒪, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.  Or, in other words, inspection 
selection is a function 𝑓(𝐼C, 𝑑, 𝑆(𝑡)), where f: ℰ × 𝒪 → 𝐼(𝑡). 
Taking into account inspector’s knowledge and limitations, its goal is to use the available 
inspection resources as efficiently as possible and to make, at every time interval, an optimal 
selection of 𝐼C pairs of entities and rules that it will inspect. To achieve that, inspector can 
decide to use a number of strategies – from very basic strategies such as random or cyclic 
selection4 of inspection pairs, to more advanced strategies where future inspections are based 
on inspections’ history, perceived resource needs of compliance or some combination 
thereof. It is important to note that the ICARUS model is strategy-agnostic and allows use of 
a plethora of inspection strategies. 
The relationship between inspector and entities, as it was already stated, is characterized by a 
significant information asymmetry and incomplete information. Table 1 summarizes the data 
known to each of the parties at 𝑡. 
Table 1. Knowledge of entities (agents) and inspector at 𝑡. 
Entity 𝒊 𝑟i, 𝒄𝐢, 𝒈𝐢, 𝝌𝐢(𝑡), 𝒑𝐢(𝑡), 𝒐𝐢(𝑡) 
Inspector 𝑆(𝑡), 𝒅, 𝐼(𝑡) 
Common knowledge (all entities and the inspector) 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝒌, 𝐼C 
SIMULATION 
A proof-of-concept simulation of a simplified variation of the ICARUS model was devised 
and constructed to: 
 verify the basic ideas and assumptions behind the proposed model, 
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 to analyse whether different approaches to inspection will lead to significantly different 
outcomes (primarily number of observed violations), and 
 to examine whether constructing a simulation of the general model and its validation 
would be justifiable. 
Process flowchart of the simulated model with specification of variables that change values in 


























Figure 3. Process flowchart. 
The simulation was performed in Microsoft Excel and Visual Basic for Applications while 
statistical analysis was performed in R [37]. The full data set, complete simulation results and 
statistical analysis can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.2009472. 
SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
Performed simulation incorporates 4 scenarios. Each scenario models different approach to 
inspection (different inspection strategy). The scenarios can be described as follows: 
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1) random scenario. Inspector completely randomly (uniform distribution) selects 𝐼C discrete 
combinations of entities and rules {𝑖, 𝑗} for inspection at every discrete time interval 𝑡. The 
only limitation is that the same combination cannot be inspected more than once in one 
interval. Random scenario is the baseline inspection strategy, 
2) resource scenario. Inspector randomly selects entities and rules, but while all the entities 
have the same probability of selection, probability of selection of different rules is defined 
by the inspector’s opinion on the cost of compliance (vector d). The selection process can 
be thought of as a variation of the Fitness proportionate selection algorithm [33], where dj has 
the role of fitness of the rule 𝑗. Hence, the probability of inspecting rule 𝑗 of a given entity 𝑖 in 






3) cycle scenario. Inspector iteratively selects all combinations of entities and rules, in a 
cyclical fashion. That is, every entity-rule combination will be inspected before any 
inspection combination is repeated. Cycle scenario reflects some traditional audit practices 
e.g. that all audit areas have to be reviewed cyclically, at least once every three to five 
years [34; p.250], and 
4) cycle_resource scenario. As its name implies, this scenario is a combination of the Resource 
and the Cycle scenarios. The entities are selected in s cyclical manner, while the rules are 
selected on a resource-weighted principle. Hence, if entity 𝑖 is selected for inspection at 𝑡, 







Scenarios have 10 discrete time intervals (“turns”) and each scenario was run 20 times. The 
scenarios were run for only 10 intervals since in practice, successful inspection strategies would 
have to produce good results rather quickly to be politically viable. Scenarios were run 20 times 
to account for randomness (e.g. depending on the order in which rules are selected for inspection, 
total number of violations might vary considerably) and provide averaged results. Furthermore, 
repeated runs enable statistical analysis of end results (violations’ totals after 10 turns). 
Scenarios are characterized by a set of static initial parameters which are the same for all 
scenarios and all the runs. In the described simulation scenarios, inspection history has no 
influence on the inspector's actions. 
Table 2 presents simulation parameters that are not entity-specific, while entity-specific 
parameters are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 2. Simulation parameters that are not entity-specific. 
Variable Value 
Number of entities (𝐧)  5 
Number of rules (𝐦)  3 
Inspector’s inspection capacity (𝐈𝑪)  4 
Impact of detected non-compliance (𝐚)  2 
Impact of detected compliance (𝐛)  1 
Fine for entity caught in violation (𝒌𝟏 = 𝒌𝟐 = 𝒌𝟑 = 𝒌)    –10 
Inspector’s assessment of cost of compliance with 1. rule      –1 
Inspector’s assessment of cost of compliance with 2. rule      –2 
Inspector’s assessment of cost of compliance with 3. rule      –3 
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Table 3. Entity-specific simulation parameters. 
Entity (i) 
Resource requirements (cij) 
Risk appetite (ri) j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 
1. –1,50 –2,40 –3,00 1,2 
2. –0,90 –3,20 –2,70 0,8 
3. –0,90 –2,40 –3,90 1,0 
4. –0,60 –1,60 –2,10 1,1 
5. –1,40 –2,00 –4,50 1,3 
The parameters were set according to empirical observations and some practical considerations. 
The 𝑛 and 𝑚 parameters were given low values to simulate simple environment but to still 
allow heterogeneity across entities’ through their risk appetite (𝒓) and across rules through 
related compliance costs (𝒅, 𝒄). The I𝐶  was set to be in line with the three to five years inspection 
cycle (see section Simulation Scenarios). Risk appetites of entities vary ±30 % around the risk 
neutral position, where 3 entities are risk-takers, 1 entity is risk-neutral and 1 entity is risk-
averse. Fines or regulatory punishments for violation of all 3 rules were set to the same value, 
to mimic a simple but realistic setting (see chapter Crime economics and human rationality). 
Resource requirements (compliance costs) vary significantly across different rules, and even 
across the same rule, but for different entities, to reflect differences in internal organization, 
complexity, size, business model, etc. of different organizations. However, relative order of 
rules’ compliance costs is the same for each entity. The values of compliance costs and fines 
are meaningful in relation to each other. 
In this setting, connections between entities are not set, i.e. 𝑔ip = 0, {𝑖, 𝑝 | 𝑖 ∈ ℰ ⋀ p ∈
ℰ ⋀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑝}. Entities are not aware of the inspection strategies. Entity 𝑖 can estimate inspection 
probability at 𝑡 based on its knowledge of the following variables: 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝑘, 𝐼C, 𝑟i, 𝑐i, 𝜒i(𝑡). The 
influence of inspection history and other parameters on entities and their subjective 











] , 𝑙 = 5, 𝑖 ∈ [1,5], 𝑗 ∈ [1,3]. 
(19) 
The subjective assessment of inspection probability (19) also takes into account temporal 
discounting [35] of results of previous inspections. 
Short simulation timeframe (10 turns) prevents introduction of more advanced learning 
strategies that could be honed during a longer simulation run. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
On micro-level, simulation demonstrates anticipated behaviour of agents, which is expected 
since micro-level behaviour is determined by the inbuilt rules of behaviour. Several 
illustrations of predicted micro-level behaviour are: 
1) Risk-taking entities violate rules more often than risk-neutral or risk-averse entities 
(ceteris paribus). To provide an example: although entity 1 and entity 3 have the same 
cost of compliance for rule 2, since entity 1 is a risk-taker and entity 3 is risk-neutral, 
entity 1 sometimes violates rule 2, while entity 3 never does. 
2) Rules with higher cost of compliance are violated more often then rules with lower cost of 
compliance (ceteris paribus). For example, entity 3 is risk-neutral and entity 4 has slight 
preference for risk-taking. Cost of compliance with rule 3 is, however, significantly higher 
for entity 3. Hence, entity 3 violates rule 3 around 26 % of times (accross all runs and all 
simulation scenarios), and entity 4 never violates the respective rule. 
S. Smojver 
290 
3) Punishment (caught violation) deters entities from violation for some time, but if there are 
no subsequent inspections, entities relaps to violation. 
On macro-level, simulation again demonstrates expected behaviour. Inspections, in general, 
reduced the number of violations in the system. Figures 4 and 5 show the results of all 
simulation runs, grouped by analysed scenarios (inspection strategies). Each diagram presents 
results of 20 runs of a 10-step simulation for each of 4 simulation scenarios. Abscissae 
represent the number of steps, while ordinates represent the cumulative number of violations 
observed in each step. Size of the dot represents the number of observations in a certain point, 
while the line connects means of cumulative violations in each step. The shading around the 





Figure 4. Results of all runs for each scenario. 
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Figure 5. Results of all runs for each scenario. 
Figure 6 shows violation totals for each run (after 10 steps), grouped by inspection strategies. 
Boxplots present averaged values, while the dots present results of every single scenario. The 
size of the dot represents the number of observations in a certain cross-section of the diagram. 
Respective numerical results are presented in Table 4. 
Results shown suggest that there is a significant difference in the cumulative number of 
violations, dependent on the inspection strategy. One-way ANOVA was performed to test the 
significance of observed differences in violations. The results confirm that significance,  
F(3,76) = 21,27; MSE = 104,03; p << 0,001. Further examination of observed differences was 
performed via the Tukey’s HSD test. Test results are displayed in the Table 5. 
Presented results confirm that inspection strategies which considered resource needs performed 




Figure 6. The violations totals for each of 4 observed inspection strategies. 
Table 4. Simulation Data Summary. 
Simulation Scenario n Mean SD SE 
Random 20 16,40 3,136 0,701 
Resource 20 13,75 2,447 0,547 
Cycle 20 12,70 1,342 0,300 
Cycle_Resource 20 10,95 1,395 0,312 
Total 80 13,45 2,942 0,329 
Table 5. Results of the Tukey’s HSD test
6
. 




95 % CI Adjusted 
p-value Lower Upper 
Resource - Random     –2,65 –4,487 –0,813 0,0017* 
Random - Cycle 3,70 1,863 5,537 0,0000** 
Random - Cycle_Resource 5,45 3,613 7,287 0,0000** 
Resource - Cycle 1,05 –0,787 2,887 0,4417 
Resource - Cycle_Resource 2,80 0,963 4,637 0,0008** 
Cycle_Resource - Cycle     –1,75 –3,587 0,087 0,0676 
*adjusted p-value < 0,01 
**adjusted p-value < 0,001 
However, the result of cycle-based strategies should be taken with caution, since the relationship 
between 𝐼C, m and n in this setup is such that full cycle (inspection of all rules at all entities) can 
be performed in less than 4 periods, which might be overly optimistic in some inspection 
environments [26]. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that Cycle_Resource scenario 
achieved better results than the Cycle scenario, albeit with borderline statistical significance. 
CONCLUSION 
This article presented ICARUS – an agent-based model for inspection of compliance to many 
rules. The model was created to address the shortcomings of often-used approaches to the 
inspection problem such as over-idealization of assumptions, narrowness of application and, 
in particular, limitation to inspection of the one-inspectee-one-rule situations. The presented 
model was implemented in a somewhat simplified setting (this includes simplification of 
values of some parameters as well as rather small number of entities and runs) and the 
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working hypothesis that conduct of inspections based on knowledge of resource needs for 
compliance reduces total non-compliance in the system was tested. 
The results are promising as conducted simulation demonstrated expected micro-level and 
macro-level behaviour and showed that resource-focused inspection strategies perform 
significantly better than random strategies and better than cycle-based strategies. 
Furthermore, attained results encourage development of a full-scale model and related 
simulation that should be subjected to extensive testing and validation. Further research 
should also empirically validate significance and test characteristics of association between 
compliance resource requirements and observed violation rates. The developed full-scale 
model and its simulation should enable comparison of effectiveness of various inspection 
strategies and, through parameter estimation and sensitivity analysis, identification of parts of 
the parameter space in which those strategies achieve the best results. 
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